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This paper will elaborate the different Platonic elements of dialogue as 
philosophical basis for Gadamerian hermeneutical structures. The 
intersubjective cross-examination found in Plato’s Dialogue shows that the real 
meaning comes from the real encounters between speakers; or in Gadamer’s 
term: encounters between text and the reader. For Gadamer, it is always 
important in this pursuit of meaning and truth that we examine our own 
prejudice. Cross-examining our own claim of truth and belief is an essential 
element in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. I argue that we can see how the Platonic 
model of dialogue is easily aligned with the Gadamerian positive approach 
towards ‘traditions.’ There is a constant dialogue at work in interpretation, a 
dialogue between the past and the present, between different traditions and 
points of view. Dialogue is an important keyword for both Plato and Gadamer 
in their efforts to their existential quest of wisdom. 
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Introduction 
 This paper tries to assess the possible interweavement between 
the Platonic dialogues and Gadamerian hermeneutics. I will start by (I) 
describing the dialectical process and its relationship with the dialogues 
in Platonic works. I believe that this basic description will help us to 
comprehend better the Platonic concept of hermeneutics. (II) I will also 
explain the reasons why the Platonic model of cross-examination 
approach might justify the concept of prejudice and the positivity of 
tradition in Gadamerian hermeneutics. I will finally follow by (III) 
examining whether dialectic in Platonic dialogues and Gadamerian 
hermeneutics is a methodological approach more than an ‘unstructured’ 
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ontological approach to the real experience. I assume that Gadamer’s 
appreciation of the tradition and prejudice in his theory of hermeneutics 
comes from his understanding of the latter part. I also believe that since 
the Platonic model of dialogue differs from the rhetoric model, the 
purpose of dialectic opens a new possibility for an existentialist pursuit of 
truth – which is also emphasized by Gadamer. 
Characters of Platonic Dialectic and Dialogues 
 What is the meaning of dialectic in Platonic dialogues? I 
think Plato himself would be bewildered by this question as he never 
gives us a definitive answer. Dialectic is defined rather merely in the 
Dictionary of Merriam-Webster as (a) “discussion and reasoning by 
dialogue as a method of intellectual investigation,” and (b) “the Platonic 
investigation of the eternal ideas.”  Oxford English Dictionary defines 
dialectic as “the art of investigating or discussing the truth of opinions.”  
We can sense the teleological element in these definitions of ‘dialectic’; 
the words ‘investigation’ and ‘discussion’ – which are exercised in the 
dialogues – seem to point to the purpose of the dialogue itself, which is 
the truth. How did Plato lead his interlocutors to understand the truth in 
that dialogic investigation? Liu and Sui (2014, 755) try to answer this 
question by linking Platonic dialogues with Gadamerian model of 
dialogue that emphasizes the openness, equality, and sincerity. These are 
the main characteristics of the Platonic dialogue and what Socrates wants 
is the full engagement of the participants in the discovery and inquiry of 
truth and reality.  
The Sophist is driven more by the desire to distinguish himself 
and is not genuinely committed to rationality.  Unlike the discussions 
with the Sophists where the participants appeared to be intimidated, 
dialogues with Socrates were always under an atmosphere of openness, 
equality, and sincerity (Liu and Sui 2014, 756). For example, when 
talking about what justice is in The Republic, Cephalus, Polemarchus, 
Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Adeimantus give their opinions one after 
another. Socrates gives his opinions and refutations one by one. Although 
not every participant is so polite, Socrates is quite competent in putting 
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the overall situation under control and makes sure that it is open, equal 
and sincere. One participant who is also a sophist, Thrasymachus, seems 
to be so confident in his arguments that he “would be ironical and 
unwilling to answer” and seems to “give a loud, sarcastic laugh” to his 
dialogue partner (The Republic 336e-337a). However, Socrates always 
tries to answer him politely “if Polemarchus and I made an error in our 
investigation, you should know that we did so unwillingly” and “(T)hat’s 
because you are a clever fellow Thrasymachus” (Republic, 337a). A good 
atmosphere is a premise for the successful proceeding of dialogue. 
Although it is not the main topic under concern, it gives the participants 
the feeling of openness, equality, and sincerity. No matter what the 
reaction of other participants towards his thoughts, Socrates seems to be 
so charismatic that he can always bring them to such an open atmosphere 
which can encourage them to air their views.  
Gjesdal (2010, 67-70) – a famous Gadamerian scholar – proposes 
that the Platonic dialogue is an "ongoing process of coming to an 
understanding about a given subject matter, is defined by its being (a) 
bilateral, (b) oriented toward a subject matter, and (c) nonconclusive." 
These three characters of the Platonic dialogues imply that knowledge 
requires that the interlocutors understand the rationality of the other’s 
standpoint.  When a speaker leaves behind an original claim for a result 
of his/her thoughtful deliberation, he or she is only getting closer to 
knowledge as accurate, justified belief (Gjesdal, 68). Platonic dialogues 
seem to have been staged as interactions where the listeners and speakers 
become immersed in the scene (Fortunoff 1998). For Gadamer, as for 
Plato, dialectic is inseparable from the dialogue. Bathold (2019) points to 
four main factors of dialogue in Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics:  
“(1) a dialogue is focused on die Sache, the subject 
matter. The aim of the dialogue is not to win the 
other over to one’s side—it is not a debate. Nor 
does it aim at a subjective understanding of the 
other. Rather, both parties open themselves to 
agreeing on the matter itself.  
(2) Dialogue requires that each party possesses a 
“good-will” to understand, that is, an openness to 
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hear something new in such a way as to forge a 
connection with another. Thus one could say that 
dialogic openness aims at solidarity.  
(3) A good dialogue entails a willingness to offer 
reasons and justifications for one’s views. One 
must be open not only to the voice of the other but 
to make an effort to explain oneself to another.  
(4) a good dialogue requires a commitment that 
one “knows one does not know.”  
 
The general-purpose Platonic dialogues are the change of 
Athenian moral order, which demands a discussion instead of an ending 
statement. What is on Socrates’ mind is how to improve the interlocutors’ 
understanding of major moral issues rather than tell them what they 
should do. He is fully aware that doctrines and conclusions have little 
effect on people’s souls. Their dogmatic opinions or traditional ideas 
must be changed little by little and only by the careful examination of 
each bit of their thought can they change what has long been held, 
drawing insights from the dialogue. 
The rigorous cross-examination is the process. In discussing what 
justice is, Socrates listens carefully to his interlocutors’ opinions, 
analyzes with them and tells what is wrong with their opinion. However, 
he does not give his definition of what is justice. It is the process towards 
the truth that counts most since the process of dialogue also reflects the 
process of thinking; thus, dialogue with Socrates become a good practice 
of thinking – another goal of Platonic dialogue. Therefore, people can see 
that Platonic dialogue emphasizes the process instead of the conclusion. 
The Platonic dialogue aims for knowledge which is realized through 
dialogic cross-examinations instead of monologic teaching. In the next 
part, I will focus on this Platonic cross-examination process and relate 
this idea with the Gadamerian concept of truth and prejudice. 
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Gadamer’s Prejudice and the Cross-examinations in Platonic 
Dialogues 
I argue that Gadamer harnesses these characteristics of the 
Platonic dialogic element in his understanding of objectivity, of the truth. 
Over and against the ‘objective-scientific’ conceptions of truth, Gadamer 
asserts that truth is primarily an event, a phenomenon, at which someone 
encounters a more extensive thing and beyond himself.  The truth is not 
the consequence of applying some pair of criteria that demand the 
distanced judgment of adequacy or inadequacy of the subject. For 
Gadamer, “truth exceeds the criteria-based judgment of the individual 
(Bathold 2019).”  From the perspective of hermeneutics, the main 
characteristic of the Platonic dialogues is their ‘eventfulness.’ Generally, 
the Platonic dialogue shares the general characteristics of dialogue in 
hermeneutic understanding. Platonic dialogue is proceeding under an 
atmosphere of openness, equality, and sincerity as I have mentioned 
above. It highlights the process rather than the conclusion. What one gets, 
at last, is better self-understanding and self-improvement. Some ideas 
from the mind of the interlocutors are not as evident as when they are 
spoken out. In exchanging their thoughts, some interlocutors and Socrates 
can have a better understanding and whether they can persuade 
themselves. Thus, either by attempting to get their thoughts clear or 
trying to understand the others, Platonic dialogue is helpful to the 
participants to achieve self-understanding and self-improvement.  
This self-understanding and self-improvement come as results of 
examining our own truth, the subjective truth, in the process of dialogue. 
Cross-examining our own claim of truth and belief is an essential element 
in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Gadamer also speaks about the Heideggerian 
disclosure of the fore-structure of understanding in the hermeneutic 
experience. The fore-structure, according to Heidegger, is a distinctive 
capacity that occurs in all individuals to perceive the meaning of being 
(Holroyd 2007, 3).  What the fore-structure offers is an indistinct 
comprehension of the existential nature of existence. What is implied is 
that every meeting we have is grounded and directed by something pre-
existed – a way of conceiving that has been decided even before we are 
interested in that meeting. Gadamer believes that within the fore-structure 
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of understanding, whenever we recognize and comprehend something, 
the interpretation is founded mainly upon what Heidegger frames as our 
fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception. What all of this guide us to 
understand is that there can never be a presupposition-less stance in any 
act of interpretation (Holroyd 2007, 3).  Awareness that we possess a 
fore-structure of understanding is often taken for granted as prejudice and 
tradition which should be removed in the pursuit of the objective truth. 
Gadamer does not agree with this negative view of tradition and 
prejudice. Gadamerian hermeneutical process emphasizes the role of this 
tradition and prejudice. Gadamer writes: 
“Even a master of the historical method is not able 
to keep himself entirely free from the prejudices of 
his time, his social environment, and his national 
situation, etc. Is this a failing? And even if it were, 
I regard it as a necessary philosophical task to 
consider why this failure always occurs wherever 
anything is achieved. In other words, I consider the 
only scientific thing is to recognize what is, instead 
of starting from what ought to be or could be 
(Gadamer 2004, 512).” 
 
Cross-examination is the pattern in the Platonic dialogues, 
containing the uncertainty and ambiguity of meaning in the conversation 
of the participants, resembles the Gadamerian appreciation of the 
tradition and prejudice. In the closely and eagerly questioned arguments, 
cross-examination in the Platonic dialogue takes shape. It forces 
respondents to think deeply and try to realize their fore-structures of 
thinking: tradition and prejudice. It forces respondents to think 
profoundly and attempt to remove any ambiguity. Sometimes people do 
not doubt or take their’ common sense’ for granted. Nothing is so certain 
by doing the cross-examination, and no concept is so absolute that there 
is no doubt about it. It can help the participants in the dialogue – both the 
respondents and the questioners – to cultivate a spirit of the query (Liu & 
Sui 2014, 760). The inquiry is an invitation to dialogue, which in turn 
mandates openness and curiosity. In this way, he departs from earlier 
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hermeneutic endeavors that attempted to devise a methodology for proper 
interpretation of meaning (Weinsheimer 2004, 161). How would Plato 
deliver his cross-examinations? Kinney (1983, 243) proposes four stages 
of development of the Platonic dialectic that is demonstrated in Plato’s 
text.  
On the first level of the dialogue, Plato formulates the dialectical 
process as a five-fold scheme of name; description; image; knowledge or 
understanding of the object; and the true reality. While this scheme is not 
a definition of dialectic, it is the dialectical attempt to give a rational 
account or explanation of knowledge by listing its components and 
describing their interaction (Kinney 1983, 243). The order of the scheme 
itself marks the ascent to full knowledge, the experience of the Eidos 
themselves, through logos. First, words are questioned in order to 
understand their meanings or definitions better. Second, the description 
itself is worked out by turning to definitions. Third, there is the 
examination of particular instances, whether in the form of objects or 
representations of an object. Fourth, one turns to the minds’ activity, the 
source of understanding and correct opinion where the mind directs its 
inner vision to the essences, the actual realities. Rational thought is an 
ongoing interplay between the first four components (Kinney 1983, 243). 
Cross-examination is a kind of technique that can always be used 
by interlocutors in their daily lives. Not only is the topic being 
challenged, but other ideas that are so familiar and “right” may also be 
suspected. Cross-examination is such an effective way that it corresponds 
well to the Platonic philosophy as a never-ending pursuit of truth. Cross-
examination, in short, is a kind of refusal of the notion of a fixed 
meaning. As well as Plato, Gadamer believes the meaning of a text (or 
words spoken in dialogue) is never purely a function of the original 
intention of the author/speaker, but somewhat equally dependent on the 
actual situation of the reader/listener. He decenters the author or speaker 
by maintaining that understanding is not about reproducing the pre-
defined, intended meaning in as accurate form as possible, but rather 
producing meaning through the interplay of dialogue between the 
author/reader and speaker/listener (Gadamer 2004, 288).  
Logos, Jurnal Filsafat-Teologi, Vol. 18, No. 1, Januari 2021 
 8 
In the Republic, Socrates asks one question after another until his 
interlocutors have nothing to say and have to turn to Socrates to make 
things clear or give up their previous ideas. Socrates applies irony as a 
constant dialectic device to the guidance of the participant’s 
understanding of knowledge. The irony is a dialectic device used by 
Socrates in The Republic, which means that different ideas are not refuted 
at first, but affirmed, however, with the discussion going on, the 
interlocutors will notice the absurdness of their previous thought that they 
have to doubt it and negate it. Socrates is quite modest, and he always 
appears as an ignorant person. He will praise the sophists for their 
“extensive information and learning.” He encourages them to give their 
“wise opinion” concerning a topic, and he will somewhat agree with 
them. Later, by discussion, the “wise people” will find the irrationality in 
their argument. Maybe at first, Socrates knows something wrong in the 
argument of his interlocutors, but he does not deny their ideas directly or 
instantly but give them positive responses. The initial agreement helps to 
create a friendly atmosphere in the first place and also shows sincerity 
because it indicates that participants of dialogue are on the same boat and 
they want to go ahead together. The dialogue participants can dig deeper 
into the topic without much enmity or aversion in the first place. After 
all, the primary purpose of the dialogue or Socrates inquiry is to provoke 
people’s interest and attention to think deeply about the condition and 
purpose of their life and their souls. This model of provocation 
challenges the interlocutors to examine their prejudices and tradition – 
and at the same time encourages them to create new meaning in the 
dialogue with Socrates’ horizons. 
Is Dialectic a Systematic Method or More an Experience? 
We have seen that both Plato and Gadamer have expressed their 
ways of doing the cross-examination in the dialogue. We know that this 
element of dialectic is considered as one crucial aspect in the dialogic 
process. I was wondering whether there exists such a ‘method’ in both 
Platonic and Gadamerian dialectics or they are more ‘free’ inquiries of 
truth based on experience.  
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I will begin by saying that Gadamerian hermeneutics is not 
mainly a methodology, nor is it a procedure of reading or translating the 
‘correct’ meaning of the text or spoken word.  Neither can it be a 
procedure to prevent misunderstanding of the speaker’s purpose since 
Gadamer believes there is not any fixed reality from the meaning of these 
words.  The spoken words instead display new hints of meaning in each 
new dialectical investigation. So, Gadamerian hermeneutics does not 
seek to replicate the text or speech to purely capture what someone has 
said in order to find the meaning, but rather, seeks to investigate 
opportunities for the creation of new meaning which is generated in 
dialogues between the readers or speakers. The goal of this exploration 
and cross-examination between the listeners and speakers, for both 
Gadamer and Plato, is to reach an understanding that centers less on 
asserting one’s point of view and more on personal transformation.  
Consequently, meaning (what the words mean in that context) can 
never be separated from application and experience.  The thought of an 
effect is critical in another way. Not only is that the listener a 
consequence of the speaker, because the horizons of both speaker and 
speaker fuse; the listener can also be part of the new exploration of 
meanings the dialogue. Every encounter with tradition that takes place 
within the historical-consciousness involves the experience of tension 
between the speaker and ‘the present.’  ‘Historically effected 
consciousness’ or what simply Gadamer refers to ‘effective history’ 
claims that “understanding is, essentially, a historically effected event 
(Gadamer 2004, 300).” This is a challenging thought to grasp.  In the 
areas of literary criticism and hermeneutics (when hermeneutics 
principally referred to the methods and rules of interpretation), it was 
initially assumed that meaning dwelt with the main speaker or author. 
Thus, the objective of interpretation was to discern the author’s or main 
speaker’s intention that would unlock the objective meaning for all times. 
But Gadamer thinks that it makes no sense to talk about the meaning of a 
text or speech aside from our listening or reading-experience of it 
(Weinsheimer 2004, 159). Thus dialogue, whether using text or speech 
among interlocutors, always has something different to say since 
meaning is generated through the occasion of disclosure instead of 
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something created by a speaker or text (Weinsheimer 2004, 160).  
Although Gadamer is concerned about recognizing the affected 
consciousness of the text or speaker, his previous work does not define an 
immediate inclusion of “a critical based reflection, that being the 
identification, inclusion, and critique of socio-political infrastructures and 
agendas.” (Smith 1991, 24).   In his later work, however, Gadamer 
becomes more explicit in his belief that hermeneutic phenomenology is 
open to the traditional horizon of the dialogue partners while also being 
open to a critique of that tradition.  
We can compare this Gadamerian approach to fusions of 
meanings in Plato’s background of dialogues. Dialogues can be further 
contrasted to the model of rhetoric. Rhetoric in the ancient Greek was the 
traditional art or technique to debate. It became a unique knowledge, and 
some people taught rhetoric as the technique was needed in public 
speaking. They taught people how to use language and how to argue in 
order to win the agreement from the polis. In the original sense, rhetoric 
means the art to argue, and the primary purpose is to defeat the opponent 
and to win out. The sophist dialectic follows this model; it is more 
persuasion than an inquiry and a discovery of truth. Socrates dislikes the 
method of argument for win’s sake. There is no fusion of horizons – no 
new meaning coming out from the Sophist dialectics since the speaker 
forces his ideas to the listener in intention to rule out arguments and to 
win. It is a different approach with Plato’s dialogue. Plato concentrates 
more on the collaboration and reasoning process with the interlocutors 
for the inquiry and discovery of truth (Kidder 1997, 55).  
In this sense, the Socratic dialectic is more like a dialogue, the 
way of the discussion by the question-answer process. The discussion 
with Socrates may be floundering and struggling in the interlocutors’ 
mind and soul, but they get closer to truth and reality. They are making 
progress towards knowledge as fusions of horizons.  While understanding 
the previous claim (and prejudice), Socrates’ interlocutors participate in 
the life of the tradition which never ceases to affect their existence even 
as it receives continuous feedback from their interpretive efforts. This is 
what Gadamer calls ‘effective historical consciousness,’ a consciousness 
that remains within the circle of understanding peculiar to the age yet 
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subtly updates it in light of experience and feedback from this 
experience. Gadamer writes: 
“Tradition is not simply a precondition into which 
we come, but we produce it ourselves, since we 
understand, participate in the evolution of tradition 
and hence further determine ourselves. Thus, the 
circle of understanding is not a ‘methodological’ 
circle, but describes an ontological structural 
element in understanding (Gadamer 2004, 281).” 
 
I think Gadamer is right when he says that we cannot remove all 
of our prejudices in this dialogic process. Gadamer’s analysis of aesthetic 
and historical consciousness shows what difficulties these attempts 
imply. In Truth and Method (Gadamer 2004), the process of approaching 
different horizons is entitled ‘fusion of horizons.’ By the fusion of 
horizons, we encounter the ‘Different,’ enabling it to speak freely.  
By engaging in interpretive acts from within the tradition, the 
interpreter engages in its historical being, borrows from the inventory of 
meaning, and upgrades its respected prejudices. In turns, he/she 
constitutes a new historical perspective in his/her world.  In the dialogues 
with his interlocutors, for example, Socrates would ruin some common 
sense or proposal that was held by individuals as criteria in ethics and 
life.  The Socratic dialectic makes people recognize what they thought 
was not so dependable and even contradictory and ridiculous.  Thus, our 
prejudices are not untouchable; they are free to change.  Rational analysis 
lets interpreters sort out what is tenable and what is not in our tradition: 
“True prejudices must still finally be justified by rational knowledge 
(Gadamer 2004, 242).”  
The prejudicial character of understanding also means that, 
whenever we understand, we are involved in a dialogue that encompasses 
both our own self-understanding and our understanding of the matter at 
issue. In the dialogue of understanding our prejudices come to the front 
since they play a crucial role in opening up what is to be understood, and 
since they become evident in that process. As our prejudices thereby 
become apparent to us, so they can also become the focus of questioning 
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in their own turn (Malpas 2013).  Immersing ourselves in an unfamiliar 
tradition gives us a chance to reflect seriously on our pre-understandings, 
together with the historical distance itself which in turns would stimulate 
self-reflection and self-criticism. The Platonic dialectic in the dialogue 
represents Socrates’ understanding of the process of attaining knowledge 
through this kind of self-criticism.  
The Platonic dialectic is more like the question-answer process of 
dialogue based on their ordinary backgrounds and prejudices than a 
sophisticated philosophical method of attaining truth or of rhetoric. 
Unlike the sophist dialectic whose aim is to win an argument without 
paying attention to reality and truth, the Socratic dialectic is to focus on 
the more reasonable and the more real. It leads individuals away from 
view and to understanding by analyzing their given prejudices on that 
opinion. Plato would not inform his interlocutors the answers to those big 
questions, but encourage them to dig the answers with him. Plato’s 
dialectic triggers new thoughts and new ideas. After the negation of the 
interlocutors’ previous ideas, he will lead them to new ones. However, 
Socrates does not give any certain conclusion to a topic. He ‘only’ acts as 
a guide or a midwife. The production of an idea and meaning is due to 
every individual himself.  
Plato, seems to me, does not consider dialectic as a method, 
because for him correct understanding is the understanding that leads to 
the ontological level rather than methodological. This means that truth 
can be achieved not through methods but through real dialogues, where 
more questions can be asked. I propose that his dialectic serves more as a 
practical philosophy. In this framework, I can see Plato’s connection to 
the Gadamerian hermeneutics which presents the concept of historical 
and dialectical “experience,” where knowledge is not a mere bias of 
perception but is an event and an encounter. Both Gadamer and Plato 
emphasize that meaning is not produced by individual interiority but 
from interrelated historical insights that the individual experiences. While 
Plato teaches that meaning and truth comes not only from himself and his 
wisdom as a philosopher, Gadamer maintains that meaning also comes 
from the historical dimension of the life of the interlocutors. 
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The philosophy of Gadamer hermeneutics requires that our form 
rests on hermeneutical principles, and hermeneutics rests on human 
existential principles. He rejects all forms of certainty and continues 
Heidegger’s existentialism with a point of suppressing the dialectical 
logic among the speakers or the readers. Dialectics must be understood 
existentially because the essence of understanding the conversation or the 
text is our understanding of ourselves and our own being. When we 
participate in the dialogues, at present, we also present our life 
experiences in the past, thus giving birth to a balance of understanding of 
ourselves.  
In this existential context, Plato also relates human understanding 
to an interpretive action. The process of understanding the interlocutors is 
always preceded by the pre-understanding of the participants of the 
dialogues. We approach the dialogues always with a set of questions or 
with potential meaning in the conversations. It is through this expectation 
horizon that we enter a process of understanding that is conditioned by 
the historical reality. Plato provides a dialectical approach for the reader 
both by the subject matter discussed in the dialogues, the first level, and 
the structure of the interchange between the dialogic partners, the second 
level. Using the Gadamerian approach, even I, the reader, can bring the 
dialectical training to the third level when I reflect on the first and second 
levels and come to a clear understanding of dialectic. By taking me 
through his dialogues, Plato, in effect, teaches me how to think more 
clearly and to reason correctly.  Dialectic is the critical link between 
thought and reality. These existential elements in the dialectical 
understanding of Gadamer and Plato go beyond the systematic method of 
analysis, and therefore, I believe that dialectics is neither a systematic 
method nor a logical scheme. It is more an existentialist approach to 
pursuit truth in concrete human life.   
Conclusion 
From what Plato says in some of his texts, but also from the 
openness and ambiguity of his own thinking, as reflected in many of his 
writings, it seems evident that the dialogic structure is not only an 
external quality of his dialectic. In the concrete form of cross-
examination, the dialectic is shown as a unique form of doing philosophy, 
of seeking the truth. We have seen that doing philosophy and doing it by 
means of dialogues are the same thing for Plato. Contrasted with the 
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sophist dialectic, which is more persuasion than an inquiry and a 
discovery of truth, Plato chooses a different approach: open, equal and 
sincere dialogues with his interlocutors.  
Gadamer, who regularly relates to Plato in his writings about 
hermeneutics and his conception of hermeneutics, could be understood in 
many ways as someone who tries to explain further the Platonic dialogic 
reasoning and thinking. Both his explicit references and his theory of 
hermeneutics may show Plato’s influence on Gadamer’s work. Moreover, 
on the other side, Gadamer’s ideas offer the fruitful tools for translating 
the structure and the extent of Plato’s dialogues in contemporary 
thoughts.  
The interweavement of thoughts between Plato and Gadamer can 
also be seen in their efforts to give positive meaning to prejudice and 
tradition. There is a constant dialogue at work in interpretation, a 
dialogue between the past and the present, between different traditions 
and points of view. The past does not have to be the distant past of 
antiquity – it can be the recent past of a moment just gone; the point is 
that in both cases the same hermeneutical problem arises: how can the 
different interlocutors accommodate or negotiate meanings external to 
themselves? Platonic dialectic seems to affirm the Gadamerian 
hermeneutical approach that meaning itself is always produced by the 
coming together of the immediate and the point of tradition one seeks to 
understand.  
Good dialogue requires a humble playfulness in which we get 
caught up and lose ourselves in connection with another (Weinsheimer 
2004, 161-162). The dialogue indicates the central motif of Gadamer’s 
notion of truth: “To reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a 
matter of putting oneself forward and successfully asserting one’s own 
point of view, but being transformed into a communion in which we do 
not remain what we were (Gadamer 2004, 379).” When we participate in 
the dialogues, at that time, we then present our life experiences in the 
past, thus giving birth to a balance of understanding of ourselves. These 
existential elements in the dialectical understanding of Gadamer and 
Plato go beyond the systematic method of analysis. It is instead an 
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